

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 March 1983

Mr. Brian V. Kinney
Chief, Declassification and
Historical Research Branch
Records Management Division
Washington Headquarters Services
Room 1D517, Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Kinney:

Mr. E.E. Lowry's memorandum of 17 March 1983 forwarded to us one document with an attachment, with the request that we review their classification status. We have reviewed the document and have found that the attachment, SNIE 10-5-54, "Soviet Bloc Reaction to Certain US Courses of Action to Restrict Bloc Representation in the US", has been downgraded to Confidential. The covering document, Sherman Kent's forwarding letter of 29 June 1954 which passed the document to the NSC, is accordingly downgraded to Confidential (Unclassified When Separated From Attachment).

Your copy of the letter and its attachment are returned herewith as requested. We have marked each to show our actions.

Sincerely,

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Chief, Classification Review Division
Office of Information Services
Directorate of Administration

Enclosures:
As Stated

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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29 June 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Reaction to Certain US Courses of Action
to Restrict Bloc Representation in the US

1. SNIE 10-5-53, "Soviet Bloc Reaction to Certain US Courses of Action to Restrict Bloc Representation in the US", is attached for your information and use in connection with the discussion of "Quest for Acquisition of Strategic Intelligence by the USSR" at the Planning Board meeting tomorrow morning, 30 June.

2. This estimate was approved by the LAC on 29 June.

SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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(Unclassified when Separated from E.O. 11652)

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SNIE 10-5-54
29 June 1954

**SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SNIE 10-5-54**

**SOVIET BLOC REACTION TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION
TO RESTRICT BLOC REPRESENTATION IN THE '50s**

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 29 June 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Director of Intelligence, AEC, and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

29 June 1954

SUBJECT: SMIE 10-5-54: SOVIET BLOC REACTION TO CERTAIN US
COURSES OF ACTION TO RESTRICT BLOC
REPRESENTATION IN THE US

THE PROBLEM

To estimate (a) the likelihood of Soviet Bloc retaliation in response to US restrictions (as assumed below) on Soviet Bloc collection of unclassified materials of strategic intelligence value by Soviet Bloc representatives in the United States, (b) the probable character of such retaliatory measures, and (c) the effect of such retaliation on the US foreign intelligence effort.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. The US imposes restrictions on Soviet Bloc representatives in the US designed to prevent them from acquiring "publicly available unclassified strategic intelligence materials," such as aerial maps, aerial photographs and mosaics, topographical maps, geodetic maps,

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city plans, publications on government or government-sponsored technical research projects, which normally may be obtained openly in the US by purchase or request. These restrictions would not apply to newspapers, periodicals, books, technical journals, general purpose maps, and other published materials normally available commercially.

2. These restrictions would be of the same general character as those presently imposed by the Soviet Government and would include, but would not necessarily be limited to, the following:

- a. Notification of Soviet Bloc diplomatic, official, and other personnel, including Soviet Bloc representatives in international organizations and quasi-official agencies, that they were prohibited from acquiring by any means, including photographing or sketching, information concerning military objects, institutions, technology and armaments, weapons, large hydraulic works, installations, rail-road junctions, tunnels, and bridges, industrial establishments, scientific research institutions, laboratories, electric power stations, radio, telephones and telegraph stations, and all unclassified materials of the kind listed above, paragraph 1.

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- b. Notification of all Soviet Bloc missions in the US that these missions and any offices thereof must be plainly marked to indicate their official status.
 - c. Official advice to Soviet Bloc missions that any of their representatives who failed to reveal their affiliations in correspondence with US citizens or institutions will henceforth be considered to have violated the accepted norms of diplomatic conduct.
 - d. Application to Soviet Bloc representatives of travel restrictions that are strictly reciprocal with those applied to US representatives in the USSR or the Soviet Satellites.
 - e. Activation of an education and guidance program to insure refusals by institutions engaged in manufacturing or research for the military agencies and the Atomic Energy Commission as well as by private US distributors and salespeople to supply unclassified materials of the kind listed above, paragraph 1, to Soviet Bloc representatives.
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- f. Activation of a program for prevention of publication of scientific, technical, industrial, and economic information prejudicial to the defense interests of the US, and for control of export of the unclassified materials of the kind listed above, paragraph 1, to Soviet Bloc governments.
- g. Notification of Soviet Bloc nations that all of their representatives must apply at a central government office for unclassified government documents.

THE ESTIMATE

Possible Soviet Bloc Reaction to the Assumed Restrictions

3. Soviet leaders would probably conclude that the assumed US restrictions would not be effective in reducing the collection of unclassified material of priority interest, although they would make the effort more difficult and costly. Soviet leaders would probably calculate initially and may eventually determine that these restrictions could be largely circumvented by the use of local Communists and sympathizers, agents, third parties, third countries, and the domestic and international mails. Thus the Soviet reaction

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would probably be based only in small part on the calculated and actual effect of the assumed US restrictions on its intelligence activities in the US.

4. The Soviet Bloc reaction would depend in far greater measure upon the Kremlin's calculation of the propaganda and political consequences of such action as it might take. Whatever course of action the Kremlin adopted with respect to retaliation, Soviet Bloc propaganda would almost certainly portray the US action as deliberately and unreasonably provocative and discriminatory against the Soviet Bloc. (This would be possible, since the assumed restrictions are selective and aimed at the Soviet Bloc only, differing in this respect from the Soviet restrictions, which at least in form apply to representatives of all states with diplomatic missions in Moscow, although in practice the restrictions are not as strictly applied to the Soviet Satellites as they are to representatives of Western nations.) The Soviet leaders might believe that a refusal of the Soviet Bloc to be provoked into retaliation could be represented as a demonstration of Soviet self-confidence and maturity that could be contrasted in propaganda with a caricature of the US violating accepted norms of diplomatic conduct as a result of unreasonable fears and uncertainty. On the other hand, Soviet leaders might calculate that a Soviet Bloc retaliation to the US action could be presented as a justifiable

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reaction to US discrimination, and that failure to retaliate might be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

5. The Soviet Bloc reaction would probably also depend upon the manner in which the assumed restrictions are applied. A blanket application of all the restrictions, with attendant official notice and publicity, would probably cause the Soviets to take countermeasures. On the other hand, if restrictions were applied progressively, appeared to be directed equally and reciprocally to all diplomatic missions, and attended by carefully controlled releases of information, the Soviets might not apply retaliatory countermeasures. Moreover, in some cases, such as travel, restrictions could be implemented by a refusal to grant privileges to Soviet Bloc representatives that are not accorded to our representatives, rather than by the application of formal published directives. A progressive application of restrictions would also permit an appraisal of Soviet reactions as the restrictions are applied.

6. On balance, we believe Soviet leaders would conclude that:

- a. US curtailment of the present privileges of Soviet Bloc representatives, without Soviet retaliation, would result in some practical inconvenience to

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the Soviet Bloc and the danger of some loss of political prestige.

- b. Successive curtailments of privileges on both sides would at every step be more disadvantageous to the US intelligence collection effort than to the Soviet Bloc effort, since the US is much more dependent upon the retention of the present level of privileges for intelligence collection than is the Soviet Bloc.
- c. It would be generally to the advantage of the Soviet Bloc, therefore, to retaliate by increasing the restrictions on US representatives in the Soviet Bloc.

We therefore believe that, if all the restrictions mentioned in the assumptions were applied en bloc, the Soviet Bloc would respond by retaliatory countermeasures. However, if the restrictions were applied carefully and progressively, such action might minimize the Soviet retaliatory countermeasures.

PROBABLE SOVIET BLOC REACTION TO LESS COMPREHENSIVE US RESTRICTIVE MEASURES

- 7. Some of the assumed US restrictions would be more objectionable to the Soviet Bloc than others. Measures such as those

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assumed in 2a., 2d., and 2g., which directly restrict the freedom of Soviet Bloc representatives would be the most objectionable in Soviet eyes and the most likely to provoke retaliatory action.

8. On the other hand, measures of an administrative or procedural nature, defining conduct compatible with the status of official foreign representatives, such as those assumed in 2b. and 2c., or measures designed to restrict information at its source, such as those assumed in 2e. and 2f., would probably not be considered objectionable by the Soviet Bloc. Such measures if applied singly, or apart from the assumed program as a whole, would probably not provoke Soviet retaliation.

RETALIATORY MEASURES THE SOVIET BLOC MIGHT ADOPT

9. Since the assumed US restrictions would not, in the main, exceed those currently imposed by the Bloc, Soviet Bloc retaliation could not be strictly reciprocal. Retaliatory measures would probably be adopted on the basis of the additional difficulties they would cause the US. If any retaliatory measures were adopted they would probably include intensified surveillance and increased harassment of US personnel rather than restrictions exactly comparable to those imposed by the US.

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10. Specific retaliatory measures most likely to be adopted include the following:

- a. Further limitation of the movements of US representatives either by direct travel restrictions or by the imposition of greater administrative hindrances to travel.
- b. Increasingly strict enforcement of the existing regulations governing the conduct of diplomatic personnel in the Soviet Union, including more strict enforcement of restrictions on photography.
- c. Increased restrictions on the purchasing activities of US representatives in Moscow, and restrictions on US efforts to obtain publications.
- d. Increased harassment of diplomatic personnel designed to hinder their activities, possibly including provocative attempts to establish grounds for expulsion.

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 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 WASHINGTON, HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

March 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Request for Declassification Review

During the systematic review of all classified Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) documents being carried out under the guidelines of Executive Order 12356, the Declassification and Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Directorate for Correspondence and Directives, Washington Headquarters Services, turned up the attached document(s).

The documents were either originated by your agency, contain information for which your agency is the classification authority, or are otherwise of interest to you.

It is requested that your agency review the documents and recommend declassification, continued classification at the present or lesser level of classification, and/or review by other agencies.

It is requested that you provide response within 60 days so that a decision on the disposition of the documents may be made promptly. In your response, you may wish to provide guidance with regard to what categories of information you do and do not wish to have referred to you in the future.

Your assistance in effecting this review will be most appreciated. Please return the documents to Mr. Brian V. Kinney, Chief, Declassification and Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Washington Headquarters Services, Room 1D517, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301, upon completion of your review.

Without attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

E. E. Lowry Jr.
 E. E. Lowry Jr.
 OSD Records Administrator

Attachments (1) Memo, re: SNIE 10-5-54, Jun 29, 1954 (TS), w/Attached SNIE 10-5-54, Jun 29, 1954 (TS).

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